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A R T I C L E
Sector specifi c regulation in network industries has be-come a widely discussed topic among academics, policy 
makers, industry economists and regulators themselves. 
Th e issue of these debates has usually been on whether 
such regulation is necessary and, if so, what its optimal 
design should be. We briefl y describe a general economic 
framework to assess regulatory remedies. On this basis, we 
discuss the need for market power regulation in the fol-
lowing network industries: telecommunication, railways, 
and post. Th e economic need for regulation is then con-
trasted with the implementation of actual legislation in the 
European Union.
General analytical framework
Our theoretical framework starts from a free market pri-
macy assumption: markets, if they function properly, pro-
vide fi rms with the right incentives to enter markets, set 
prices, and invest in innovation at a socially optimal level. 
Naturally, there are a number of obstacles for markets to 
function well in the above sense. Market failures are omni-
present and give rise to potentially benefi cial regulation—
at the risk of these regulations failing as well. Starting from 
a free market situation, if there is no market failure or no 
harmful potential market failure, there is no need to in-
tervene. If the market fails persistently and government 
chooses to intervene, it sets up regulations. If the regulated 
situation still fails when confronted with the socially desir-
able outcome —either because regulation is not appropri-
ate to cope with the initial market failure or due to other 
political or social goals—there is scope for re-regulation. 
However, if regulation in general is deemed not appropri-
ate or detrimental to attain social goals, this should result 
in de-regulation.
Th ere are various potential sources of market failure. 
In this contribution, we focus on natural bottlenecks and 
their specifi c need for regulation (see Jaag and Trinkner 
(2010) for a comprehensive discussion on market failures 
in network industries). Monopolistic bottlenecks are pres-
ent if an industry, network layer or value chain element 
exhibits the properties of natural monopoly (subadditive 
cost function), considerable sunk costs, and no substitutes 
(that is, no economic possibilities for bypass). Such bot-
tlenecks are present in most network industries and raise 
the issue of natural market power being capable to distort 
competition in a harmful way. 
Deriving regulatory models to cope with monopolistic 
bottlenecks
Th e goal of any regulation of a stable monopolistic bottle-
neck is to enable non-discriminatory access by third par-
ties (which cannot bypass the bottleneck owner) while 
minimizing the infringement of property rights on the 
bottleneck resource. 
Th ere are a number of potential regulatory instru-
ments. Among them are ex post or ex ante regulation 
of prices and/or access conditions, and separation of ac-
counts, functions, structures, and/or ownership. Some of 
them can be applied ex ante or ex post, some of them in-
terrelate with each other.
Combinations of these regulatory instruments into 
specifi c regulatory models can potentially be applied in 
practice. As a precondition, the models must be techni-
cally and commercially feasible. Figure 1 shows the range 
of possible regulatory levels in terms of bottleneck regula-
tion (0 to M). In increasing order, the regulatory models 
become more intensive and intrusive with respect to prop-
erty rights infringement. Th e stronger the property rights 
of one or all operators are confi ned, the stronger it will 
aff ect investment and innovation incentives in the long-
run. For example, doing without sector-specifi c regula-
tion (level 0) results in strong incentives to the bottle-neck 
owner to develop it further, as it is the residual claimant 
of all profi ts resulting from its development. At the same 
time, all operators without access to the bottleneck have 
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strong incentives to search for alternative technologies in 
order to bypass the bottleneck and off er substitute servic-
es. A structural separation of the bottleneck resource with 
regulated attractive access conditions (level V) adds to its 
stability and therefore creates the need for continuing (fol-
low-up) regulation. At the same time, the owner’s incen-
tives to invest in its development are low as cost savings are 
automatically passed down to competitors. If there is an 
(unregulated) bypass opportunity, the bottleneck operator 
will rather invest there in order to bypass regulation.
Assessment Criteria 
From an economic point of view, all regulatory models 
must fi rst stand up a thorough economic analysis and 
comparison according to a number of qualitative and 
quantitative criteria. Th ese are partly contradictory, which 
mirrors diff erent interests of the various stakeholders in 
the marketplace: incumbent operators and their residual 
claimants, new operators, employees, business customers, 
private customers, and tax payers. Th e qualitative criteria 
include proportionality, expedience, competitive neu-
trality (including lightness, symmetry), incentive neutral-
ity, subsidiary, simplicity, transparency, and temporality.
While these criteria are of qualitative nature and mostly 
have an indirect impact on welfare, quantitative criteria 
should also be included to compare the economic eff ects 
of any model compared to the (non)regulation in place 
in the short to medium and long run (market failure ver-
sus regulatory failure). Th us, static eff ects such as benefi ts 
from regulation, productive effi  ciency, and direct costs of 
regulation should be considered as well as dynamic aspects 
such as effi  ciency incentives, innovation and investment 
incentives, risks, and the eff ects of regulatory and organi-
zational dynamics.
Th e instrument with the least net economic cost is 
then the one which should be chosen—if it suffi  ciently 
conforms to the qualitative criteria. Of course, welfare ef-
fects are hard to quantify as they often take eff ect in the 
long-run (for example innovation incentives) and would 
therefore have to be explicitly considered in a dynamic 
setting.
Application to selected network industries
A common characteristic of all network industries is that 
they form a coherent and interrelated system. Th e central 
aspect of networks is their ability to transport goods or 
information between two geographically diverse locations. 
At the nodes in the network (which are connected by 
transportation means), the routing follows specifi c rules. 
For market power issues, networks can be subdivided 
into various network layers. Following the disaggregated 
approach of Knieps (2000), these layers can and should 
be analyzed separately—notwithstanding the strong con-
nections among the layers. Th e underlying conviction is 
that some layers may be fully competitive while others 
constitute persistent monopolistic bottlenecks. An aggre-
gate analysis would come to the imprecise conclusion that 
competition is not workable as one single non-competitive 
layer would bias the entire analysis. Figure 2 shows diff er-
ent network layers which are important in the framework 
of our discussion. 
In the remainder below we identify monopolistic bot-
tlenecks, derive the appropriate regulatory remedy based 
on the presented analytical framework, and compare our 
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fi ndings with the current EC regulatory framework for 
Telecommunications, Railways, and Posts. We do not 
discuss the national implementation of EC directives and 
regulations as the latter constitute the common denomina-
tor and the legal basis and leeway for national regulation.
Telecommunication
In the (wire-bound) telecommunications sector, the rel-
evant network layers are the wide-area and last-mile pas-
sive infrastructures (ducts, cables), active infrastructures 
(electronic equipment) and services. While all last-mile 
infrastructures can be considered a natural monopoly due 
to subadditive costs, only the last-mile ducts and cables 
are a monopolistic bottleneck which cannot (sensibly) be 
duplicated. However, as there is increasing intermodal 
competition (for example, by wireless communication, in 
many developed countries also by local loops established 
by electricity and cable companies) and fast technological 
progress (fi ber optics), the traditional cooper bottleneck in 
the last mile becomes increasingly contested. Hence, from 
an economics perspective, access regulation—which can 
be phased out eventually—to these temporary (copper-
based) bottlenecks is more appropriate than a persistent 
functional or structural separation which are considered to 
be irreversible by the European Regulators Group. Once 
new fi ber optics are in place however, the fi ber local loop 
might be a stable bottleneck in case consumers were to 
demand capacities that can be delivered by fi ber-to-the-
home infrastructures only.   
Currently, national regulatory authorities in the 
European Union operate within the 2002 electronic com-
munications regulatory framework. Providers considered 
having signifi cant market power in the identifi ed product 
and service markets may be subject to a variety of behav-
ioral remedies including non-discriminatory access rules to 
network elements and wholesale services. Recently, func-
tional separation has been promoted by the Commission 
but largely rejected by the European Parliament. With the 
approval of a major overhaul of EU telecoms rules in late 
2009  national regulatory authorities are provided with the 
additional tool of functional separation as an exception-
al remedy. Th e Commission has so far been very careful 
about giving guidelines with regard to when the separa-
tion might be used. It believes that in exceptional cases it 
may be justifi ed where there has been persistent failure to 
achieve eff ective non-discrimination, and where there is 
little or no prospect of infrastructure competition within a 
reasonable timeframe. With the emergence of fi ber-based 
networks, it is currently unclear, whether these will consti-
tute a stable bottleneck in the future.
Railway
Railways in Europe carry both passenger and freight traf-
fi c. Th ey provide vital economic and social links both 
within countries and across Europe. However, they have 
steadily lost market shares to other modes of transporta-
tion over the last decades. Railways also require high levels 
of subsidies; less than half of the total costs of rail trans-
port in Europe are borne directly by passenger and freight 
customers. 
In the railways sector, the relevant network layers are 
tracks and railway stations, network management (slot al-
location, safety measures), rolling stock, and services. Th e 
tracks and railway stations can be considered a monopo-
listic bottleneck due to subadditivity and signifi cant sunk 
costs; hence, there is a potential for regulation. Th ere is 
only little technological progress on that layer, meaning 
that the bottleneck will likely be persistent. However, rail-
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Figure 2 |  Layers in network industries






ways fi nd themselves in intermodal competition against 
transportation means on roads, water, and air. Rail market 
shares exceed rarely more than 20 percent in the modal 
split. Depending of the eff ectiveness of this intermodal 
competition, two main scenarios are thinkable. Either 
price regulation of existing incumbents might be appro-
priate (level 1, for example, Japan), or an intense regula-
tion of the monopolistic bottlenecks to enforce competi-
tion on the service level (level IV or V, EC approach). Th e 
latter necessitates strong regulatory interventions, such as 
access regulation combined with functional or structural 
separation of infrastructures (tracks, train stations) and 
passenger services in order to assure non-discriminatory 
access conditions. Th ereby, the decision on the intensity of 
the separation depends on the existing synergies between 
the various network layers. Caution might be indicated in 
well developed railway systems exhibiting tight synchro-
nized schedules and scarce capacities on rail tracks and 
train stations.
Starting in the 1990s, signifi cant structural reforms 
have been initiated within the railways sector on the EU-
level. Many of the reforms followed the approach adopted 
in other network industries such as telecommunications 
and electricity. Th rough Directives 91/440/EC and the 
First railway package (Directives 2001/12, 2001/13 and 
2001/14), the EU introduced and reinforced the principle 
of separation between infrastructure and operations. Th e 
EU directives oblige national railway systems to imple-
ment vertical separation. Th is includes, fi rstly, accounting 
and functional separation of infrastructure from opera-
tions; second separate accounts for passenger and freight; 
and third a structural or ownership separation of slot al-
location management to organizations not providing rail 
services to passengers. Th is unbundling requires separate 
companies (as implemented in Germany, Italy, France), 
but not necessarily ownership separation (as implemented 
in UK and Sweden). Th e second and the third railway 
packages have not furthered separation issues but predom-
inantly dealt with market opening, interoperability and 
rather technical topics.
Post
Th e postal sector is one of the oldest if not the oldest net-
work industry. It is usually not analyzed along the layer 
framework as in the other industries. If so, the only layer 
exhibiting subadditive costs as well as sunk costs would the 
road system positioned on layer 1. It is  public and open 
to anyone on nondiscriminatory terms. Rather, a disaggre-
gate analysis focuses on the various parts of the value chain 
which consist of collection, sorting, transport and delivery 
of mail and parcel items. Collection and delivery exhibit 
subadditivity and hence the characteristics of a natural mo-
nopoly. As there are no signifi cant sunk costs, there is no 
bottleneck facility which would justify access regulation or 
even mandated separation in general. Hence competition 
law (level 0) should be suffi  cient. Nevertheless, access to 
post offi  ce boxes or information on change of addresses is 
often regulated in liberalized markets. Note that these are 
no monopolistic bottlenecks. In our general framework as 
presented in Jaag and Trinkner (2010), regulation can still 
be justifi ed on the basis of market failures arising from net-
work externalities (here between operators, in analogy to 
termination issues in mobile telecommunication). In such 
cases, expost access regulation (level 2) might be justifi ed.
Th e purpose of the recent postal sector policy in the 
European Union is to complete the internal market for 
postal services and to ensure that effi  cient, reliable postal 
services are available at a good quality throughout the EU 
to all its citizens at aff ordable prices. Directive (2008/6/
EC) foresees full market opening by 2013. Th e directive 
gives the member states the right, but not the duty to regu-
late access. Nevertheless, the directive suggests that access 
for certain elements of the postal infrastructure might be 
granted, such as information on change of address and 
postcodes, P.O. box delivery, redirection and return to 
sender services (Article 11 of the Directive). 
Conclusion
When determining the appropriate regulatory model for 
network industries, not only the (non-)existence of a bot-
tleneck facility has to be considered, but also qualitative 
criteria and their impact on competition. From an eco-
nomic perspective, separation seems to be an adequate reg-
ulatory model in the railway market, but not necessarily in 
telecommunication where the appropriateness of separa-
tion remedies will depend on the future development of 
consumer demand towards very fast bandwidths that can 
only be provided with fi ber wires. In the postal market, 
there is no need for separation. EC regulations are about in 
line with the regulatory need as derived from our analyti-
cal framework.
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